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從西田哲學來看現象學的「超越」問題

黃文宏

2016臺大文史哲學報Arts and Humanities被引 1

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摘要

My intention in this article is twofold. Firstly, it aims to clarify the meanings of the "transcendence" in Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenology and, secondly, to indicate the significance of Nishida’s contributions to phenomenology. This article is divided into four sections. Section one is a brief introduction to the basic problems of understanding transcendence in philosophy. In section two, I explicate Husserl’s redefinition of transcendence. Husserl elucidates intentionality in terms of transcendence. His basic understanding of immanence and transcendence is discussed in The Idea of Phenomenology (1907). I expound and expand the meanings of transcendence through Husserl’s "inner horizon" and "outer horizon." In section three, I discuss Heidegger’s rethinking and transformation of Husserl’s intentionality in terms of the "transcendence of Dasein (existence)." I argue that Heidegger’s approach to intentionality implies the transcendence toward an authentic Dasein. Transcendence is ultimately the transcendence to authentic self. In the last section, I discuss Nishida’s insights into the nature of true self. Nishida begins his philosophy together with Husserl and Heidegger from a Cartesian point of view, but his notion of self-awareness is basically religion-oriented. He regards it as "negating self-awareness." The self-negating is absolute and excludes any possible sense from Solipsism. Some of Nishida’s possible contributions and new perspectives that Nishida provided to phenomenology will be expounded.

引用本文(GB/T 7714)

黃文宏. 從西田哲學來看現象學的「超越」問題[J]. 臺大文史哲學報, 2016.

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DOI:https://doi.org/10.6258/bcla.2016.84.04

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