Game Analysis on Quality and Safety of Food Supply Chain
摘要
This paper analyses players' strategy under single game, repeated games and dynamic game with incomplete information in food supply chain. It shows that players usually choose uncooperative opportunism for pursuing the maximum of personal profits in once game which is frequent in market. However, cooperative equilibrium may be achieved between players in termlessly repeated game so that food safety supply is insured. KMRW reputation model reveals that players can cooperate in finitely repeated game before fixed stage under incomplete information of uncertain player type. At last, this paper puts forward some pertinent suggestions.
引用本文（GB/T 7714）
Yunhua Zhang. Game Analysis on Quality and Safety of Food Supply Chain[J]. 未知来源, 2004.
引文网络
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