中國大陸「小產權房」的政治經濟學─基於產權理論的分析
摘要
The purpose of this article is to analyze ”minor property right” houses in rural China. As the suppliers of ”minor property right” houses, the key role of rural collective organization- village committees is discussed in the article. Land property right system and central-local fiscal relations have important effects on the emergence of ”minor property right” houses in transitional China. With respect to a simple property rights model, the article integrates the two factors in order to explain the behavior of rural collective organization. Farmlands are collectively owned in rural China. The non-agricultural use and conveyance of farmlands are strictly prohibited by the state. The coercive policies of farmland expropriate rights and opportunities of peasants to participate in real estate market. The regulation of farmland property rights is equivalent to price control and would bring about rent dissipation and benefit loss to Chinese farmers. The existence of transaction costs prevents the state from controlling overall attributes of collective ownership of farmland. Therefore, collective organization, peasants, and rational individuals are all able to manipulate some attributes of collective land to minimize loss of property rights control. ”Minor property right” houses are thus the consequence of rational choice made by Chinese farmers to mitigate institutional constraints.