自願設立獨立董事、關係人交易與公司價值關聯性之研究：代理理論與訊號發射理論之比較
摘要
The theories used to explain the corporate governance problem make use of agency theory and signaling theory, but prior research has only explored one of these theories and the empirical results have not been consistent. This paper uses the simultaneous equation model to investigate the cause-effect relationship among independent directors, related party transactions and firm value. The data consists of 145 companies from those firms listed on TSE and OTC in Taiwan which voluntarily engaged independent directors from 2001 to 2003, and, as a control sample, an additional group of 145 companies which did not set up independent directors. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, the proportion of the related party transactions has a negative effect on the firm value. Second, the higher the proportion of the related party transactions, the lower the proportion of independent directors to all directors. Third, the set-up of the independent directors can significantly reduce the related party transactions. Fourth, the firm value does not have a significant effect on the amount of the related party transactions. Fifth, the companies voluntarily establishing independent directors do not have a significant relation with the firm value.