论中国经济转型期权力租金来源与控制－一个理论模型及基于1978~2007年数据的实证分析
摘要
The paper takes the change of government behaviors during China's economic transition period as the research background, and based on analyzing the source of public power and the formation of power rent, a model is constructed on the public power distribution and power rent scale, and the source and the control of power rent in China is analyzed from theoretical and empirical angles. The author believes that the source of power rent in the period for social government officials comes from power scarcity and the use of exclusiveness. The free use of public power and high cost operation lead to corruption and nonproductive profit-seeking activities (DUP); power rent comes from ”producer surplus” of power use, which is closely related-with the over increase of the public power using costs. Finally, the paper gives some suggestions to protect officers from corruption in using power.